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Abstract  
After decades of isolation, Myanmar is now actively re-engaging with the global 
economy. For successful re-engagement, Myanmar needs to implement 
comprehensive economic reforms based on a shared vision for long-term economic 
development that is characterized by human-centered, high, sustainable, pro-poor, 
inclusive, and balanced economic growth. In this paper, we propose five growth 
strategies: “Agriculture Plus Plus,” an export-oriented strategy, a foreign direct 
investment-driven strategy, a two-polar growth strategy, and a strategy to develop 
domestic economic corridors. These strategies are used as guides to translate these 
development agendas into a set of implementable policies, programs, and projects. 
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Introduction 
The political and economic landscape of Myanmar is experiencing a new dawn, 
with the country moving toward political and civil reforms and economic growth. While 
the world waited for the opening up of Myanmar for many years, the country responded 
only after the establishment of a “civilian” government led by President U Thein Sein in 
March 2011. Since then, Myanmar has responded positively, in both words and actions, 
presenting its development agenda to the world at large and to its immediate neighbors 
in Southeast Asia and East Asia. 
After decades of isolation, Myanmar is now actively re-engaging with the global 
economy. The new political and international environment provides Myanmar with a 
good opportunity to join the global and regional economy. The country has embarked on 
an ambitious program of sweeping reforms to end its isolation and integrate its economy 
with the global economy. This political transition has received active support from all 
nations, as demonstrated by the lifting of western sanctions. Myanmar’s future will be 
decided largely by its ability to remain on course with its reforms and openness, which 
will, in turn, benefit its people. 
Myanmar’s reforms and the opening up of its economy occur in the midst of 
economic integration and the rise of its giant neighbors, i.e., China and India. Both 
countries provide Myanmar with new opportunities and challenges. Economic 
integration facilitates Myanmar’s participation in East Asia’s production and 
distribution networks. Furthermore, export-oriented and FDI-driven growth strategies 
will enable Myanmar to grow faster than before. Simultaneously, Myanmar’s domestic 
industries will face severe competition in an integrated economy, as they must compete 
with imports from China, India, and other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) countries. Moreover, high economic growth is necessary but not sufficient. 
Growth should be pro-poor, inclusive, and balanced, as well as environmentally and 
socially sustainable. In a nutshell, human-centered growth is required. 
To successfully re-engage with the global economy after decades of isolation, the 
development agenda for Myanmar is inevitably comprehensive and challenging. Indeed, 
even the prioritized agenda in the Framework for Economic and Social Reform (FESR), 
which the current government issued as the first policy and reform strategic plan, 
consists of ten areas of interrelated reforms, namely, (1) fiscal and tax reform, (2) 
monetary and finance sector reform, (3) trade and investment liberalization, (4) private 
sector development, (5) improvements in health and education, (6) food security and 
agricultural growth, (7) governance and transparency, (8) improvements in mobile 
telephony and the Internet, (9) infrastructure investment, and (10) efficient and effective 
government. Translating these development agendas into a series of implementable 
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programs is a challenging but immediate task for Myanmar. This task requires a shared 
comprehensive development vision as a guide to further prioritize and streamline 
equally important development agendas. 
This paper does not address all development agendas; instead, it focuses on growth 
strategies. Given Myanmar’s current status as one of the lowest income countries in the 
world, high and sustained growth is necessary. Achieving a high growth rate is an 
enormous challenge for Myanmar. Moreover, the quality of growth is also important, 
because although growth is necessary, it is not sufficient to achieve long-term poverty 
reduction. Trickle-down economics does not work automatically, and growth 
accompanied by an increase in inequality may even increase poverty. Myanmar 
comprises geographically and ecologically diversified regions with several ethnic 
groups. Therefore, growth should be inclusive and balanced among every region and 
state. In addition, environmental sustainability supported by green growth is 
indispensable for prospective growth. Thus, we propose five growth strategies for 
Myanmar. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews past growth 
performance and envisages future growth prospects. Section 2 examines the role of 
agriculture in the long-run development of the country and proposes the “Agriculture 
Plus Plus” growth strategy. Section 3 examines Myanmar’s external sector through a 
comparison with other Southeast Asian countries and proposes an export-oriented and a 
foreign direct investment (FDI)-driven growth strategy. Section 4 deals with the 
geographical aspect of growth and proposes a two-polar growth strategy, emphasizing 
the importance of Yangon and Mandalay as growth poles. Section 5 argues the 
significance of the re-emergence and re-engagement of Myanmar in the region and 
examines the manner of transforming Myanmar into a connecting node in the region 
from a missing link in the past. The paper concludes that if sound strategies are adapted, 
Myanmar has the potential of becoming a star growth performer in the region in the 
future. 
 
 
1. Growth performance and prospects 
Before exploring Myanmar’s growth performance and prospects, we need to 
analyze the dubious nature of the official statistics on which our discussions rely. 
According to official GDP data compiled and published by the Myanmar government, 
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Myanmar achieved double-digit growth for 12 consecutive years from FY1999 to 
FY2010.
1
 However, few believe that Myanmar experienced such high and sustained 
economic growth while they were under international sanctions. Figure 1 indicates three 
series of GDP statistics: (1) the official series A, compiled and published by the 
Myanmar government; (2) the official series B, estimated by the UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme) (2011) on the basis of official series A and adjusted for 
strong controls on the exchange rate; and (3) an estimate based on satellite images of 
lights at night by Kumagai et al. (2012a). Considerable discrepancies are observed. 
Although it is difficult to determine which series optimally reflects reality, both 
additional estimates imply that the official statistics may have been over-reported. The 
Myanmar government itself indicated another sign of the low reliability of the official 
statistics. The government initiated efforts to produce more reliable statistics after the 
inauguration of the Thein Sein administration in March 2011. In addition, in his speech 
on June 19, 2012, President U Thein Sein clearly identified having accurate and reliable 
statistics as one of the four pillars of economic policies.
2
 
 
Figure 1.  Myanmar’s GDP in different sources 
 
Sources: UNDP (2011) and Kumagai, et al (2012a). 
 
                                                   
1
 Myanmar’s fiscal year starts in April and ends in March. 
2
 President U Thein Sein’s speech on the four economic policies appeared in the New Light of 
Myanmar, Myanmar’s only English daily newspaper, on June 20, 2012.  
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1.1. Growth performance and prospects 
Table 1 presents the growth performance and prospects of selected Asian economies, 
including Myanmar, based on the World Economic Outlook Database compiled by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and official statistics of its member countries. These 
statistics suggest that Myanmar experienced rapid growth in the past two decades, 7.9% 
on average in the 1990s and 11.5% in the 2000s. Myanmar’s GDP per capita in terms of 
the current US dollar increased by 10.8 times over the last two decades, the 
second-highest increase in ASEAN countries following Vietnam. Nevertheless, even 
with this performance, which may also reflect over-reporting, Myanmar’s GDP per 
capita in 2010 was USD 742, the lowest among ASEAN countries and one of the lowest 
among developing Asian countries. The gap in GDP per capita between Vietnam and 
Myanmar widened from USD 30 in 1990 to USD 432 in 2010. Based on IMF statistics, 
the size of Myanmar’s GDP as of 2010 was approximately 43.8% that of Vietnam’s. 
Moreover, according to the latest medium-term IMF forecasts, Lao PDR (9.1%) and 
Cambodia (8.2%) are expected to outpace Myanmar (7.5%). 
 
Table 1. Growth performance and prospects of selected Asian economies 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2003 for the 
1970s, and April 2013 for the subsequent years.  For Myanmar, September 2011 edition is also used 
for the 1980s and 1990s. 
Note: There is a sharp drop in Myanmar's per capita GDP in 1990, probably due to the turmoil in 
1988 and afterwards and changes in exchange rates. To see the medium term trend, changes in per 
capita GDP in the 1980s for Myanmar covers 1980-1989, instead of 1980-1990. The data for 
Cambodia and Vietnam starts from 1986 and 1973 respectively. 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010-18 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010
USD
Singapore 9.9 8.6 8.0 6.3 4.3 5.4 2.6 1.8 2.0 44,697
Hong Kong SAR 10.0 7.5 4.4 4.5 4.5 5.9 2.3 1.9 1.3 32,429
Korea 8.5 10.9 7.3 4.6 4.1 5.9 3.7 1.8 1.8 20,540
Taiwan 10.9 8.5 6.9 4.3 4.4 5.5 3.4 1.8 1.3 18,488
Malaysia 8.9 6.7 7.9 5.1 6.0 4.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 8,634
Thailand 7.7 8.8 4.9 4.8 4.9 3.8 2.2 1.3 2.5 4,992
China 6.9 10.4 11.7 11.7 9.7 3.0 1.7 2.8 4.7 4,423
Indonesia 8.7 6.1 4.4 5.8 7.4 6.4 1.1 1.3 3.7 2,986
Philippines 6.7 1.9 3.2 5.3 6.3 3.8 1.1 1.3 2.0 2,155
Bhutan 4.5 10.9 5.3 9.7 11.1 1.8 1.7 1.5 2.6 2,063
Papua New Guinea 2.8 1.6 5.1 4.5 8.7 3.8 0.9 0.8 2.2 1,494
India 3.2 6.2 6.2 8.2 7.3 2.2 1.4 1.2 2.9 1,356
Vietnam 4.3 6.5 8.4 8.1 6.2 1.0 0.2 4.1 2.9 1,174
Lao PDR 4.1 6.2 6.8 8.0 9.1 0.3 0.7 1.4 3.6 1,105
Cambodia n.a. 11.7 7.8 8.9 8.2 n.a. 3.9 2.7 2.6 753
Myanmar 4.7 1.4 7.9 11.5 7.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 4.2 742
Bangladesh 1.7 4.1 5.5 6.6 7.5 3.1 1.2 1.3 2.0 723
Nepal 1.8 5.3 5.6 4.5 4.6 1.8 1.6 1.2 2.3 533
GDP growth, constant prices, local currency Per capita GDP, nominal, USD
Annual average in % Times
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According to the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) (2012), Myanmar 
aspires to achieve the highest average annual GDP per capita growth rate (7.81%) 
among ASEAN countries for the two decades up to 2030 (Table 2). Given such a growth 
rate, Myanmar’s GDP per capita is expected to increase from USD 714.8 in 2010 to 
USD 3,216.4 in 2030, marginally overtaking Cambodia, which is expected to remain 
lower than USD 3,000 in 2030. Because developed ASEAN countries also have 
aspirations for steady economic growth, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam 
(CLMV countries) will need to achieve significantly higher economic growth to narrow 
the development gaps in the region. Furthermore, one of the biggest challenges for 
latecomers is to sustain a high long-term growth rate.  
 
Table 2.  ASEAN aspirations (2010-2030) 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank Institute (2012).  
Original sources: Population: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, United Nations, 
Available at http://esa.un.prg/unpp/index.asp; ASEAN 2030 background paper on country 
perspectives.  
 
As indicated in Table 2, and implied by economic growth theories, as economies 
grow, their growth rates tend to decline in the long run. This becomes a source of 
convergence, i.e., narrowing the development gaps. The so-called Newly Industrialized 
Economies (Asian NIEs), Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan, achieved high 
economic growth of more than or close to 10% per annum in the 1970s and 1980s, 
before slowing down in subsequent decades. Similar tendencies are observed in 
developed ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, although the 
IMF believes that Indonesia has greater potential. For Myanmar, sustaining a 7.81% 
GDP per Capita
in 2010
(US$, at 2010
market prices)
2030 Target
(2030 value as a
multiple of 2010
value)
GDP per Capita
in 2030
(US$, at 2010
market prices)
GDP per Capita
2010 – 2030 Average
Yearly Growth
(%)
Brunei Darussalam 30,173.2 2.5 75,432.9 4.69
Cambodia 733.5 4.0 2,933.9 7.18
Indonesia 3,023.3 3.5 10,581.6 6.46
Lao PDR 1,035.0 3.5 3,622.6 6.46
Malaysia 8,260.1 3.0 24,780.4 5.65
Myanmar 714.8 4.5 3,216.4 7.81
Philippines 2,013.6 2.5 5,034.0 4.69
Singapore 43,897.6 1.8 79,300.0 3.00
Thailand 4,734.8 3.0 14,204.4 5.65
Niet Nam 1,238.9 3.5 4,336.2 6.46
ASEAN 3,105.2 2.97 9,325.3 5.60
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average economic growth for the next two decades is an extremely challenging 
aspiration.  
 
1.2. Quality of growth and sustainability 
To create high and sustainable long-term economic growth, Myanmar needs to 
explicitly focus on the quality of growth. Economic growth must be inclusive to 
facilitate the reduction of poverty and inequality; otherwise, it will not be socially and 
politically sustainable.  
 
Figure 2.  Rural and urban poverty incidence in 2010 
 
Source: UNDP and MNPED (2011). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the uneven distribution of poverty incidence in 2010 by state 
and region. There is a strong positive correlation between rural and urban poverty, and 
the poverty incidence in rural areas is higher than that in urban areas. The highest 
poverty incidence is observed in the rural area of Chin State, where 80% of the 
population lives below the poverty line, a proportion that is more than five times higher 
than that in the rural area of Sagaing Region (14.9%). The lowest poverty incidence is 
observed in the urban area of Kayah State, where the poverty incidence in the rural area 
(16.3%) is also significantly lower than the national average (29.2%). Note that the 
poverty incidences in the rural areas of Yangon (28.7%) and Mandalay (31.6%), the 
centers of economic activity in Myanmar, are comparable to the national average. These 
differences in poverty incidences can result in social instability. Therefore, the Myanmar 
government explicitly focuses on this issue in designing its economic growth strategy to 
reduce economic disparity both among regions and states as well as between urban and 
rural areas.  
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Although income is an important indicator, it is not a sufficient measure of 
economic development. Table 3 presents the Human Development Index (HDI) 
compiled by the UNDP. Myanmar’s HDI in 2012 was 0.498, the second lowest among 
its neighboring countries, following Nepal, ranking Myanmar 149th out of 187 
reporting countries. In addition, Table 3 indicates Myanmar’s life expectancy at birth 
was 65.7 years, also the second lowest, following Cambodia, and significantly lower 
than the average in East Asia and the Pacific (72.7 years). Most of the detailed items 
correlate with the HDI and income levels; however, this does not imply that an increase 
in income automatically improves each statistic. Rather, an economic growth strategy 
needs to be designed to accompany improvements in these items. 
 
Table 3.  Selected indicators of the Human Development Index (HDI) 
 
Source: UNDP (2013). 
 
Another key aspect of ensuring long-term economic growth is fiscal sustainability. 
The role of infrastructure in economic development cannot be overemphasized, and one 
of the biggest challenges is financing infrastructure projects. Most Asian countries have 
effectively used official development assistance (ODA) from developed countries, the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other donors to meet the huge 
demand for infrastructure financing during the process of economic development. Table 
4 provides an overview of the external debt of selected Asian countries. In 2011, the 
debt burden in terms of total external debt stocks to gross national income (GNI) was 
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the highest in Lao PDR (80.3%), followed by Bhutan (65.0%) and Vietnam (49.1%). 
For most countries in the table, this ratio decreased in the 2000s. In particular, the 
developed ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, which were severely 
affected by the Asian currency crisis in the late 1990s, experienced significant increases 
in their debt burdens and successfully managed these debts in the 2000s. 
 
Table 4.  External debt of developing Asia 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
Note: For Myanmar, external debt stocks are expressed as the share to GDP, based on the data from 
IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
 
 Although CLMV countries had heavy debt burdens in 1990, they successfully 
decreased their external debt stocks to GNI ratios, but in a different manner as 
compared with Myanmar. During the last two decades, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and 
Vietnam were granted debt restructuring totaling USD 3.2 billion, USD 2.21 billion, and 
USD 12.4 billion, respectively.
3
 In contrast, debt restructuring granted to Myanmar 
during the same period was only USD 76.0 million, reflecting the country’s isolation 
under its military government. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, Myanmar began receiving ODA in 1971, and the 
resulting long-term external debt stocks sharply increased to USD 6 billion by 1994. 
Long-term loan commitments were made regularly in the 1970s and 1980s, but they 
stopped in 1998, when the military government seized power in a coup. Since then, both 
commitment and disbursement amounts have been limited, primarily owing to 
                                                   
3
 Calculated based on World Bank (2013). 
1990 2000 2010 2011 1990 2000 2010 2011
Lao PDR 204.0 151.7 84.2 80.3 8.5 8.0 13.2 n.a.
Bhutan 28.1 50.5 63.9 65.0 n.a. n.a. 13.5 11.1
Vietnam 384.0 41.9 48.4 49.1 n.a. 7.5 3.5 3.2
Cambodia 165.5 74.9 35.9 35.3 n.a. 1.7 0.9 1.0
Malaysia 36.4 48.7 37.1 34.8 12.6 5.6 5.5 3.9
Philippines 70.2 72.2 36.9 33.6 27.6 16.0 21.8 17.6
Indonesia 64.0 95.6 28.4 26.0 33.5 22.8 17.4 14.5
Thailand 33.3 66.1 26.4 24.0 16.9 16.3 4.7 3.8
Bangladesh 39.9 31.9 23.5 22.6 34.6 10.5 4.7 5.5
Nepal 44.7 52.2 23.5 20.8 15.2 7.5 10.5 9.5
India 26.6 21.5 17.4 18.3 34.9 17.5 6.8 6.5
Myanmar 168.0 65.5 17.2 15.1 18.2 1.2 7.1 n.a.
China 15.4 12.3 9.5 9.4 11.7 9.1 3.6 3.6
External debt stocks to GNI (%) Debt service ratio (%)
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economic sanctions imposed by the United States and European countries. Along with 
this trend, the payment of interest and principal  began falling into arrears, resulting in 
external debt that has remained at approximately USD 5–6 billion, with a marginal 
upward trend. By the end of 2011, the total external debt was USD 7.8 billion, of which 
USD 6.3 billion is long-term debt. That is, the observed reduction in the debt to GNI 
ratio presented in Table 3 was caused solely by an increase in GNI and not repayments. 
In short, Myanmar was isolated from the international aid community in both directions 
during the last two decades. 
 
Figure 3.  Myanmar’s long term external debt (billions USD) 
 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
Note: For Myanmar, external debt stocks are expressed as the share to GDP, based on the data from 
IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2013. 
 
The ongoing changes in Myanmar since March 2011 have been welcomed by the 
international community with a keen interest in resuming official assistance to the 
country. At this stage, the country’s total external debt and arrears were exposed as a 
major bottleneck. However, the problem has been resolved by highly cooperative 
responses from the international community, particularly from the Japanese government. 
0
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As the first major international reaction, Japan waived debts and overdue charges of 
USD 3.7 billion and reached an agreement during President U Thein Sein’s first visit to 
Tokyo in April 2012. This agreement enabled Japan to resume its yen loans to Myanmar. 
Furthermore, Japan played a key role in the Paris Club agreement of January 25, 2013, 
which provided debt relief of USD 6 billion to Myanmar and was the second 
monumental step, enabling other major donors including the ADB and the World Bank 
to provide fresh aid to Myanmar in the emerging context.
4
 
 
 
2. Role of agriculture and its new growth strategy5 
On June 19, 2012, President U Thein Sein declared that the government had entered 
the second phase of its reform strategy focusing on economic development
6
. In the same 
speech, he announced four economic policies: (1) sustained agricultural development 
toward industrialization and all-round development; (2) balanced and proportionate 
development among states and regions with equal shares of the budget and taxation, 
foreign aid, and foreign and local investment; (3) inclusive growth for entire population; 
and (4) compilation of quality and accurate statistics. 
It is natural and reasonable that the government prioritizes agriculture as a source of 
broad-based growth and poverty reduction, as it accounts for 36% of GDP, employs a 
majority of the workforce, and generates 25–30% of export earnings. 
However, Petty–Clark’s law states that the share of agriculture in employment and 
GDP decreases as GDP per capita increases, indicating that agriculture alone will not 
absorb Myanmar’s growing labor force and will not remain a leading industry in the 
long run. Then, what is the role of agriculture in the long-term economic growth of 
Myanmar, and how does agriculture realize this role? 
 
  
                                                   
4
 The Paris Club agreed to cancel half the arrears that Myanmar owed them in two stages and 
rescheduled the remaining over 15 years, with a seven-year grace period. The ADB announced that 
the arrears owed to it were cleared with the help of Japan and resumed assistance to Myanmar by 
offering a USD 512 million loan for social and economic projects. Myanmar’s arrears to the World 
Bank were also paid with the help of Japan, and the World Bank responded with a USD 440 million 
credit. 
5
 This section is primarily drawn from Kudo et al. (2013). 
6
 The New Light of Myanmar, June 20, 2012 
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2.1. Role of agriculture in long-run economic growth 
Myanmar is still an agrarian economy. Surprisingly, the share of agriculture in GDP 
was as high as approximately 60% until 2000 (Table 5). Since then, it declined to 36% 
in 2010. The five-year plan (FY2011/12–FY2015/16) targets a reduction in the share of 
agriculture from 36.4 to 29.2%, an increase in the share of industry from 26.0 to 32.1%, 
and an increase in the share of services from 37.8 to 38.7%. If the target is achieved, 
industry will replace agriculture to become the largest sector in Myanmar. 
However, the decline in the share of agriculture in the 2000s may be erroneous due 
to the overestimation of GDP figures. Many economists believe that official GDP 
figures are overestimated, and that the real growth rates are significantly smaller. During 
the overestimated period, industry grew considerably faster, at approximately 20% per 
annum, than agriculture to achieve double-digit GDP growth rates. Consequently, the 
share of agriculture in GDP substantially declined in the 2000s, whereas that of industry 
increased. 
 
Table 5.  GDP by industry 
 Primary industry Secondary industry 
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Myanmar 47 57 57 36 13 11 10 26 
Cambodia - 56 38 36 - 11 23 23 
Lao PDR - 61 49 31 - 15 19 27 
Vietnam 50 39 25 21 23 23 37 41 
Source: ADB (2012). 
 
Agriculture employs a majority of the workforce in Myanmar. Figure 4 illustrates 
the share of agricultural population (hereafter AP)
7
 in the total population of selected 
ASEAN countries. The AP share for Myanmar was 67.1% in 2010. 
The experiences of neighboring countries indicate that the AP share declines as 
GDP per capita increases, and Myanmar follows this trend. However, the decline in the 
AP share is slower than that in agricultural GDP share. For instance, the share of 
primary industry in Vietnam’s GDP declined from 50% in 1980 to 21% in 2010, but its 
AP share dropped only from 73.3% in 1980 to 63.2% in 2010. Thus, for Myanmar, 
                                                   
7
 FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) defines “agricultural population” 
as “all persons depending for their livelihood on agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry. It 
comprises all persons economically active in agriculture as well as their non-working dependents” 
(FAO Stat). 
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agriculture is expected to remain the primary source of employment for the short and 
medium term. 
 
Figure 4.  Share of agricultural population in total population 
 
Source:  FAO Stat. 
 
Figure 5 indicates agricultural GDP (hereafter AGDP) for selected ASEAN 
countries. For Thailand and Malaysia, the AGDP share declined from approximately 
35% in 1960 to approximately 10% in the 2000s. For Vietnam, AGDP share  was more 
than 40% in the late 1980s, and it declined to approximately 20% in the 2000s. These 
experiences of neighboring countries suggest that Myanmar’s AGDP share is also 
expected to decline in the long run. 
However, it should be noted that the AGDP shares of these countries do not decline 
toward zero. Moreover, in the 2000s, the declining trend of the AGDP share was 
curtailed. Figure 6 shows the value added in agriculture for Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam. Although the AGDP share declined until 2000, the absolute value of 
agricultural value added actually increased. This increase accelerated during the 2000s, 
partially because of increasing prices of primary goods supported by an ever-increasing 
world population and the economic development of large, emerging countries such as 
China. 
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Figure 5.  Agricultural GDP share 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Online. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Value added in agriculture 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Online. 
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Therefore, although the relative importance of agriculture is declining in 
industrializing economies, agriculture is not a sunset industry. In the long run, 
agriculture cannot be relied upon to absorb a larger labor force than manufacturing and 
services in developing economies; moreover, it is expected to release labor to other 
sectors. Nevertheless, agriculture can still contribute to economic development by 
increasing land and labor productivity. 
Moreover, agriculture especially facilitates the reduction of poverty. The World 
Bank’s cross-country estimates reveal that GDP growth originating in agriculture is at 
least twice as effective in reducing poverty as GDP growth originating outside 
agriculture (World Development Report 2008, p.6). The rural population represents 
approximately 70% of Myanmar’s total population. In addition, as of 2010, the 
incidence of poverty in rural areas (29%) was approximately twice as high as that in 
urban areas (15%) (NPED, SIDA, UNICEF, and UNDP, 2011). As a result, rural areas 
account for almost 85% of total poverty in Myanmar. Agriculture and its related 
businesses are expected to contribute to poverty reduction. 
Myanmar’s industrial sector continues to be dominated by agro-processing 
activities such as rice milling and oil extraction. For the foreseeable future, a 
comparative advantage will remain with primary activities such as agriculture, livestock 
breeding, fisheries, and agro-processing. Under such a situation, agricultural growth can 
induce strong growth in other economic sectors through multiplier effects. Therefore, 
for several years, the growth strategy for most agriculture-based economies must be 
anchored in agricultural progress (World Bank, 2007, p.7). 
 
2.2. How to develop agriculture? 
Given the above discussion, what strategy should be adopted for the growth of 
agriculture in Myanmar? Consider the following production function for agriculture: 
Y = Af (ALL,ANN), 
where Y is output, A is total factor productivity, AL is labor productivity, L is labor input, 
AN is land productivity, and N is land input. In this case, the sources of growth are A, AL, 
L, AN, and N. 
Table 6 presents the agricultural productivity in selected ASEAN countries. Labor 
productivity is defined as AGDP divided by economically active population in 
agriculture. Labor productivity in Malaysia is exceptionally high, USD 11,370 per unit 
of labor. Labor productivity in agriculture seems to follow the level of economic 
development. The labor productivity of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines is 
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approximately USD 1,500 per unit of labor, and that of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and 
Vietnam is approximately USD 700–800. Myanmar’s labor productivity is very low, 
approximately USD 300 per unit of labor. 
 
Table 6.  Agricultural productivity in selected ASEAN members (2009) 
 
Source: FAO Stat and ADB. 
 
Two groups of countries exist with respect to land productivity. The first includes 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines, which have a land 
productivity of approximately USD 1,500–2,500/ha. The second group includes 
Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR, which have a land productivity of less than USD 
1,000. Among these countries, Myanmar’s land productivity is exceptionally low, USD 
451/ha. 
No significant differences exist in land per unit of labor among ASEAN countries, 
except for Malaysia, which has the highest land per unit of labor (4.80 ha/labor), and 
Vietnam, which has the lowest (0.35 ha/labor). Myanmar has the second-lowest land per 
unit of labor (0.67 ha/labor). 
The above discussion suggests that we cannot rely on the growth of labor input (L) 
because an increasing proportion of the workforce will be absorbed by other sectors, 
particularly manufacturing. Therefore, we tap into four other sources of growth. 
 
(1) Expansion of agricultural land (N) 
Naturally, expansion of agricultural land is one source of growth. However, is it 
possible to reclaim agricultural land in Myanmar? 
Myanmar’s agricultural land per capita is 0.261 ha, which is on par with that of 
Thailand (0.288 ha) and Malaysia (0.282 ha) and is among the highest in populated 
ASEAN countries (Table 7). On the other hand, agricultural land (net area sown) 
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comprises only 18% of the national territory (Figure 7), which is lower than in the 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, where it is more than 30%, and 
Indonesia and Malaysia, where it is more than 20%. 
 
Table 7.  Agricultural area and population of selected ASEAN members (2009) 
  
(A)  
Agricultural 
Area 
('000 Ha) 
(B) 
Area 
 
('000 Ha) 
(C) 
Population 
 
('000) 
(A)/(B) (A)/(C) 
Myanmar 12,441 67,659 47,601 18.4% 0.261 
Malaysia 7,870 33,080 27,949 23.8% 0.282 
Thailand 19,795 51,312 68,706 38.6% 0.288 
Vietnam 10,272 33,105 86,901 31.0% 0.118 
Indonesia 53,600 190,457 237,414 28.1% 0.226 
Philippines 11,950 30,000 91,703 39.8% 0.130 
Cambodia 5,555 18,104 13,978 30.7% 0.397 
Lao PDR 2,346 23,680 6,112 9.9% 0.384 
Source:  FAO Stat. 
 
Figure 7.  Land use in Myanmar 
 
Source: Agricultural Statistics. 
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Successive governments attempted to reclaim new agricultural land, and the 
military government successfully increased the net sown area during the past two 
decades. Yet, “cultivable waste other than fallows” remains at approximately 8% of the 
national territory. Thus, it is possible to further reclaim cultivable wasteland in 
Myanmar. 
However, the frontier for reclaimable agricultural land in Myanmar has been 
disappearing and expansion of agricultural land is becoming more technically difficult 
and expensive. The military government implemented large-scale, deep-water 
reclamation projects for paddy cultivation in the Ayeyarwady Delta in the early 21st 
century, but efforts to reclaim this land mostly failed. Moreover, the environmental and 
social impacts should also be considered when planning the reclamation of agricultural 
land. Thus, we need to improve productivity rather than merely expand agricultural 
land. 
 
(2) Enhancing labor and land productivity (AL, AN) 
We suppose three types of productivity: labor productivity (AL), land productivity 
(AN), and total productivity (A). First, we discuss land and labor productivity. As Table 6 
demonstrates, agricultural labor productivity in Myanmar was USD 301 per person in 
2009, the lowest among Southeast Asian countries, less than half of that in Vietnam, and 
less than one-fifth of that in Thailand. Further, land productivity in Myanmar was USD 
451/ha in 2009, also the lowest among ASEAN countries. 
To investigate production volume rather than value, we focus on paddy, the most 
important crop in Myanmar. Table 8 shows land productivity based on paddy production 
and area in 2010. Myanmar’s paddy yield was 4.12 tons/ha, approximately the average 
for East Asian countries, indicating that there is room for improvement, although 
limited.  
However, there is skepticism regarding the statistics for Myanmar in Table 8. The 
data for Myanmar presented by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
suggests that Vietnam’s average paddy yield was nearly twice as high as that of 
Myanmar in 2008. The two sets of paddy yield data for Myanmar reflect significant 
discrepancies (Kubo, 2013, Figure 2). Again, accurate data are required to analyze 
agricultural productivity. 
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Table 8.  Paddy production and area (2010)   
  
(A) 
Production(ton) 
(B) 
Area(Ha) 
(A)/(B) 
Republic of Korea 6,136,300  892,074  6.88  
China 197,212,010  30,117,262  6.55  
Japan 10,600,000  1,628,000  6.51  
Vietnam 39,988,900  7,513,700  5.32  
Indonesia 66,469,400  13,253,500  5.02  
Myanmar 33,204,500  8,051,700  4.12  
Malaysia 2,548,000  673,745  3.78  
Philippines 15,771,700  4,354,160  3.62  
Lao PDR 3,070,640  855,114  3.59  
Cambodia 8,245,320  2,776,510  2.97  
Thailand 31,597,200  10,990,100  2.88  
Source:  FAO Stat. 
 
The widening gap in the yield between the two countries can be attributable to 
technological change rather than changes in their rice pricing policies. In fact, rice 
farmers in Myanmar are equipped with inadequate irrigation facilities and 
lower-performing HYVs (high yielding varieties)  as compared with their Vietnamese 
counterparts (Kubo, 2013). 
Both land and labor productivity for agriculture in Myanmar needs to be enhanced. 
The typical methods to enhance land productivity are irrigation and appropriate use of 
fertilizers. The Myanmar government needs to develop a comprehensive plan to 
improve irrigation and dissemination of fertilizers among farmers. A typical method of 
enhancing labor productivity is mechanization, and the mechanization of agriculture 
also requires a comprehensive plan. 
 
(3) Enhancing total agricultural productivity (A) 
We consider two ways of enhancing total agricultural productivity. First is the 
employment of higher quality products and higher degrees of processing. Myanmar 
exports low-quality agricultural products (Figure 8). For example, the price of Thai 
white rice is nearly twice as high as that of Myanmar rice in international markets. This 
is primarily due to the low quality of Myanmar rice and its poor international reputation. 
In addition, Myanmar is an importer of food, particularly processed food. Daw Than 
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Than Soe, President of City Mart, a leading retail chain, stated that approximately 80% 
of the food sold in her stores is imported because of the underdeveloped food 
processing industry and poor logistics, including cold chains (JETRO Yangon Life, 
2013). Myanmar exports low-quality and primary agricultural produce and imports 
processed food. As a result, the country’s trade balance of food is not significant against 
its general impression as a large agrarian exporter. Quality seeds; good farm 
management; improvements in post-harvest systems, processing, and marketing; and so 
forth are necessary to provide high-quality agricultural products to international 
markets. 
 
Figure 8.  Myanmar’s export/import of food in 2010 (USD, millions) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade. 
 
The second method to enhance total agricultural productivity is to diversify crops 
according to market demand. The share of paddy in sown acreage has steadily declined 
since the 1960s (Figure 9). Myanmar’s agriculture is no longer rice-dominated; it is 
more diversified. The share of pulses in sown acreage increased in the 1990s owing to 
exports, primarily to India, but stagnated in the 2000s. The share of oilseeds (groundnut 
and sesame) in sown acreage declined during the past two decades because of palm oil 
imports from Malaysia and Indonesia. The volume of other products, such as rubber, 
sugarcane, cotton, maize, fruits, and vegetables, has been increasing since the 1960s. In 
addition, livestock and fisheries demonstrate considerable potential. Given that paddy 
production remains self-sufficient, Myanmar’s agriculture can diversify into higher 
value-added crops  in response to changing market demands. 
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Figure 9.  Sown acreage by crop in Myanmar 
 
Source: Agricultural Statistics. 
 
 
2.3. Agriculture Plus Plus 
Summing up the above discussion, there are two ways to derive additional value 
from agriculture: enhancing productivity and broadening economic functions along the 
value chain. We call this strategy “Agriculture Plus Plus” after Malaysia’s 
“Manufacturing Plus Plus,” a concept coined in the Second Industrial Master Plan, 
1996–2005 (IMP2) (MITI, 1995). 
The primary thrust of Malaysia’s “Manufacturing Plus Plus” is its focus on 
attracting manufacturing facilities of higher value-added products and progressing along 
the value chain of production toward higher value-added activities by emphasizing 
research and development (R&D) and after-production activities such as services, 
distribution, and marketing. 
Because an economic policy may not be appropriate at all times or for all countries, 
Myanmar should modify Malaysia’s success scenario. Malaysia’s “Manufacturing Plus 
Plus” can be a role model for Myanmar’s “Agricultural Plus Plus” strategy. Thus, this 
strategy aims to progress along the value chain of agriculture from farming to higher 
value-added activities such as agricultural R&D, development and usage of quality 
seeds, and post-harvest businesses including distribution and marketing (first plus). In 
addition, the strategy aims to shift the entire value chain to a higher level through 
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productivity-driven growth (second plus) (Figure 10). 
Although agriculture is not a sector that absorbs a large labor force in the long run, 
it is definitely not a sunset industry. Moreover, agriculture especially facilitates the 
reduction of poverty and multiplier effects on other economic sectors. There are 
methods to increase agriculture’s value added that do not rely on the growth of labor 
and land inputs. The key is to enhance three types of productivity: labor, land, and total 
productivity; thus, the strategy was named “Agriculture Plus Plus.” We need to develop 
this broad concept to include concrete and comprehensive action plans, which is 
challenging for both the Myanmar government and the private sector. 
 
Figure 10.  “Agiculture Plus Plus” strategy 
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Source:  Authors. 
 
 
3. Globally linked and private sector-led industrial development 
3.1. Export-oriented growth strategy
8
 
As Baldwin (2004) argued, citing Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001), it is not easy to 
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 This section is primarily drawn from Kudo and Kumagai (2013). 
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statistically demonstrate the positive relationship between trade openness and economic 
growth. However, our observations in East Asia after the mid-1980s reveal that it is 
difficult for a country to achieve rapid growth without being integrated in the global 
economy. Virtually no East Asian country has achieved high economic growth without a 
strong export sector, and to do so, the smooth import of intermediate goods is key, 
especially at the early stages of export-oriented industrialization. 
More than 20 years ago, Myanmar attempted to follow this trend. Soon after the 
military assumed power in 1988, the Myanmar government launched a series of 
open-door policies that allowed private firms to engage in external trade and legitimized 
border trade with its neighboring countries. Consequently, Myanmar’s foreign trade 
rapidly increased during the 1990s and 2000s, and its exports grew 15 times during this 
period. 
Nevertheless, the value of Myanmar’s exports in 2010 was significantly lower (less 
than 10%) than Vietnam’s (Figure 11). Although Vietnam exported only 2.5 times more 
than Myanmar did in 1990, it exported more than 13 times the amount that Myanmar 
did in 2010. Even though the two countries initiated their open-door policies in the late 
1980s, why is there such a large gap in export performance? 
 
Figure 11.  Exports of Myanmar and Vietnam 
 
Source: UN Comtrade. 
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(1) Diversification of exports 
One difference between Myanmar and Vietnam is the degree of diversification of 
their exports. Table 9 indicates the shares of the top 10 exports for Myanmar and 
Vietnam in 2010. Natural gas accounted for more than half of Myanmar’s exports; it has 
been exploited offshore from Martaban Bay and transported to Thailand by pipeline 
since approximately 2000. In addition, another natural gas field off Rakhine State, Shwe, 
is under development, and it will export gas to China’s Yunnan Province by pipeline 
from 2013. This will further increase the country’s share of natural gas in its total 
exports. Myanmar’s natural gas exports increased from USD 108.6 million in 2000 to 
USD 2,595.4 million in 2010. Excluding natural gas exports, Myanmar’s total exports 
grew annually by only 6.2% from 2000 to 2010. The second-largest export item was 
wood (16%), followed by apparel and clothing (11%). Thus, only three goods accounted 
for 80% of Myanmar’s total exports in 2010. Clearly, Myanmar’s exports have yet to 
diversify. 
In contrast, Vietnam’s exports have been diversified. Apparel and clothing 
accounted for 18% of total exports in 2010, followed by footwear (13%), petroleum and 
its products (9%), miscellaneous manufactured articles (8%), and telecommunications 
and sound equipment (7%). The top 10 goods accounted for 78% of Vietnam’s total 
exports. Moreover, the share of petroleum in Vietnam’s exports declined from 33.4% in 
1990 to 19.7% in 2000 and to 6.0% in 2010. 
 
Table 9.  Top 10 export goods of Myanmar and Vietnam (2010) 
 
Source:  UN Comtrade. 
 
(2) Export of manufactured goods: Apparel and electric & electronic products 
Although Myanmar’s exports continue to be dominated by primary goods, with the 
SITC Description
Value(USD
million)
Share SITC Description
Value(USD
million)
Share
34 Natural gas 2595.4 52.4% 84 Apparel & clothing 11309.8 17.9%
24 Cork & wood 792.4 16.0% 85 Footwear 8185.7 12.9%
84 Apparel & clothing 556.2 11.2% 33 Petroleum & products 5372.1 8.5%
28 Ores & metal scrap 201.8 4.1% 89 Misc manufactured articles 4756.9 7.5%
23 Crude rubber 193.9 3.9% 76 Telecommunications & sound equipment 4626.2 7.3%
66 Non-metal minerals 165.5 3.3% 82 Furniture 4120.4 6.5%
85 Footwear 90.1 1.8% 77 Electrical machinery & parts 3268.1 5.2%
22 Oil seeds & oleaginous fruit 62.8 1.3% 65 Textile yarn & fabrics 2737.5 4.3%
68 Non-ferrous metals 51.0 1.0% 75 Office machines 2724.0 4.3%
27 Crude fertilizer 44.8 0.9% 32 Coal & Coke 1993.2 3.1%
Others 196.7 4.0% Others 14205.4 22.4%
Total 4950.5 100.0% Total 63299.6 100.0%
myanmar Vietnam
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exception of apparel and clothing, Vietnam exports various types of manufactured 
goods. Figure 12 presents the shares of manufactured goods in Myanmar’s and 
Vietnam’s exports. These shares were nearly identical between the two economies in 
1990 and 2000, approximately 12–13% and 55–58%, respectively. Vietnam, however, 
steadily increased its export share of manufactured goods to 71% in 2010, whereas that 
of Myanmar drastically declined to approximately 20% in 2005. 
 
Figure 12.  Share of manufactured goods in exports (1990-2010) 
 
Source:  UN Comtrade. 
 
Apparel and clothing are the only manufactured goods for export from Myanmar. 
The export share of manufactured goods substantially increased in the late 1990s, 
primarily because of garment exports to the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU). However, the US import ban introduced in 2003 and the EU’s unwillingness to 
source goods manufactured in Myanmar because of human rights issues severely 
damaged the country’s apparel exports, which declined from USD 800 million in 2000 
to USD 560 million in 2010. In contrast, Vietnam steadily expanded its apparel exports, 
from USD 1.65 billion in 2000 to USD 11.31 billion in 2010, 20 times higher than the 
value of Myanmar’s apparel exports. 
Another important category of export goods is electric and electronic (E&E) 
products. Historically, E&E products comprised the primary exports for most East Asian 
countries. In particular, after signing of the Plaza Accord on exchange rates in 1985, 
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E&E multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Japan and Asian NIEs shifted their production 
bases to developing ASEAN countries, thus establishing production networks in the 
region. The dependence on E&E exports indicates a particular country’s participation in 
East Asian production networks. Figure 13 presents the share of E&E products in the 
exports of selected ASEAN countries. Thailand and Malaysia seem to be “graduating” 
from being dependent on massive E&E exports; while Vietnam is increasing its E&E 
exports. Myanmar, Cambodia, and Lao PDR seem unable to join East Asian E&E 
production networks. 
 
Figure 13.  Share of electric and electronic products in exports 
 
Source:  UN Comtrade. 
 
(3) Joining East Asian production and distribution networks 
As described in Kimura and Obashi (2010), participation in production networks is 
essential to the novel development strategy of East Asian countries.  
These economies aggressively utilize MNEs in an open setting and accept 
almost all sorts of such firms, which enables them to participate in international 
production networks and form industrial agglomerations. After this stage, local 
firms, entrepreneurs, and engineers increase their participation through their 
penetration into MNEs’ production networks.” (Ibid, p.1). 
Here, we regard the weighted Grubel–Lloyd (GL) index based on Harmonized 
System (HS) two-digit level as a “proxy” for the degree of participation in East Asian 
production networks. The GL index is a measure of the intra-industry trade of a 
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particular product, defined as 1 − ((|X_i − M_i |) ⁄ ((X_i + M_i))). It takes 1 if the trade 
for a particular product is reciprocal and balanced, i.e., the trade is completely 
intra-industry, and 0 otherwise. We calculate the GL index for the HS two-digit level 
and weighted it by the export share of each good and trade partner, but we limit the 
trade partners for ASEAN+3 countries. Thus, Figure 14 displays an intra-regional GL 
index. 
Can a higher GL index be interpreted as an indicator of tighter integration into the 
production networks? If two countries reciprocally export the parts and components of a 
particular industry, we assume the existence of a production network between them. 
Furthermore, if one country exports the parts and components of a particular industry, 
whereas the other country exports the final goods of the same industry, we assume the 
existence of a production network between them. However, if two countries reciprocally 
export the final goods of a particular industry, can we assume the existence of a 
production network between them? 
If the case of the European Union is examined, the answer might be no. For 
example, Germany exporting BMWs to France and France exporting Peugeots to 
Germany comprise intra-industry trade but not a production network. If the case of East 
Asia is examined, the answer is likely yes, because the reciprocal exports of final goods 
in East Asia tend to be intra-firm trades. For instance, under the Innovative International 
Multi-purpose Vehicles (IMV) project, Toyota exports pickup trucks from Thailand to 
other ASEAN countries, whereas it exports minivans from Indonesia to other ASEAN 
countries. This is an example of intra-industry trade as well as a production network. 
As mentioned above, Figure 14 indicates the intra-regional GL index for selected 
ASEAN countries. Note that Malaysia and Thailand, two developed ASEAN countries, 
have high GL indexes, whereas Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar—the latecomer 
ASEAN countries—have very low GL indexes. Vietnam’s GL index increased from 
0.02 in 1990 to 0.38 in 2010, indicating the country’s participation in East Asian 
production networks during the previous two decades. 
For many years, the West pressured Myanmar toward democracy and respect for 
human rights by ostracizing its military government through measures such as economic 
sanctions. Now, with the alleviation of the military rule that had enshrouded the country, 
Western sanctions have been eased or removed. This implies that Myanmar’s products 
will regain access to global markets and there will be an influx of foreign investment. 
Thus, Myanmar’s economy will become more integrated into regional and global 
economies and will have the opportunity to realize its latent potential. 
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Figure 14.  Intra-regional Grubel-Lloyd index for selected ASEAN countries 
 
Source:  Calcurated based on UN comtrade. 
 
Accordingly, Myanmar’s exports will increase and its export goods and destinations 
will diversify. For this to happen, Myanmar must first demonstrate its ability to host an 
export-oriented industry. The apparel industry seems to be the litmus test for this step. 
After that, becoming part of East Asian production and distribution networks for the 
E&E sector will be key for Myanmar to proceed to the next stage of industrialization. In 
addition, Myanmar should tap into intra-regional markets, such as China, India, and 
Thailand, as well as traditional export markets, such as the United States and the EU. 
Moreover, utilizing regional free trade agreements and further enhancing connectivity 
with these countries is important for Myanmar’s export-oriented growth strategy. 
 
3.2. FDI-driven growth strategy 
During the past decades, academics and policymakers have become considerably 
interested in attracting inward FDI to fuel economic growth. FDI brings capital, 
technology, and skills to host economies. In addition, new investment projects by 
foreign investors can create employment in host economies. Several developing 
countries have attempted to attract foreign investors by offering preferential investment 
incentives in order to build industrial clusters and to enable the participation of local 
firms in global value chains. Indeed, many East Asian economies have attracted foreign 
investment and achieved remarkably high economic growth. Figure 15 presents past 
trends in the growth of inward FDI flows and the economic growth of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Although it is difficult to accurately measure the 
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impact of FDI on economic growth, it is apparent that larger FDI inflows are associated 
with higher economic growth in East Asia. 
 
Figure 15. FDI stock and GDP per capita for four countries 
 
Source:  UNCTAD (2012). 
 
Table 10.  UNCTAD’s FDI Contribution Index, by host region, 2009* 
(Percentage shares in each variable’s total for the region) 
Region/economy 
Value 
added 
Employment Exports 
Tax 
revenue 
Wages & 
Salaries 
R&D 
expenditures 
Capital 
expenditures 
Total world        
 Developed countries 12.7 7.5 19.3 13.9 14.6 24.2 10.5 
 Developing economies 12.2 7.9 17.3 14.6 15.4 24.1 11.6 
  Africa 21.7 7.3 .. .. 21.7 37.2 18.4 
  East & Southeast Asia 10.5 9.9 30.9 7.7 8.9 22.5 6.2 
  South Asia 10.3 6.1 .. .. 16.0 .. 3.8 
  West Asia 16.8 5.5 1.9 .. 15.0 .. 3.8 
  Latin America & Caribbean 15.9 6.0 17.9 18.9 16.0 35.0 14.8 
 Transition economies 21.7 3.0 .. .. 11.2 15.4 25.7 
Source:  UNCTAD (2012, p.33). 
Note:  Data from economies not listed in the FDI Contribution Index (because they do not cover at 
least four of the seven variables), are included in these calculations. 
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Table 10 indicates the significance of FDI in host economies in terms of value 
added, employment, exports, tax revenue, wages and salaries, R&D expenditures, and 
capital expenditures. East and Southeast Asia enjoy relatively high FDI contributions 
related to employment, exports, and R&D expenditures. The figures indicate that 
efficiency-seeking FDIs have developed labor-intensive and export-oriented production 
facilities in this region. Among alternative determinants, market-seeking and 
efficiency-seeking motives constitute a fundamental incentive for multinational 
manufacturing firms to make direct investment in a foreign market (Markusen, 2004). 
Their market-seeking motives tend to be weaker toward small developing economies 
and, in particular, least developed countries (LDCs). In contrast, efficiency-seeking FDI 
is encouraged by low production costs, including the wages of workers in developing 
economies. Thus, it is inferred that FDI will play a more important role in job creation 
and export enhancement in LDCs, including Myanmar. 
Drawing on the successful experiences with FDI promotion and economic growth, 
we envisage an FDI-driven growth strategy for Myanmar. In recent decades, Myanmar 
has been relatively closed to international trade and foreign investment. Whereas other 
East Asian economies have experienced rapid economic growth, primarily as a result of 
the opening up of the economy, Myanmar has experienced remarkably slow growth. 
However, the current government, led by President U Thein Sein, indicates the 
promotion of foreign investment as an important policy to accelerate economic growth. 
Therefore, it is becoming increasingly important to identify which policies Myanmar 
should implement to attract foreign investors and how FDI promotion can contribute to 
its economic growth. 
Here, we review the current status of inward FDI in Myanmar in comparison with 
its neighbors. Among CLMV and Thailand, Myanmar’s  ratio of inward FDI to GDP is 
the lowest. This ratio substantially declined from 36.1% in 2000 to 18.2% in 2011, 
indicating that international sanctions probably affected inward FDI in Myanmar. For 
instance, the US has prohibited new investment by US companies in Myanmar since 
1997 and implemented a trade and financial ban in 2003. Moreover, the EU imposed 
various sanctions, such as depriving imports from Myanmar of GSP (Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences) status since 1997. These successive sanctions severely damaged 
multinational firms’ interests in investing in Myanmar. 
Thus, Myanmar received almost no FDI from developed countries in manufacturing 
and services. In contrast, most FDIs in Myanmar were driven by resource-seeking 
motives, particularly in the energy sector, by its neighboring countries such as China 
and Thailand (Figure 16). Investments include hydropower projects in mountainous 
areas as well as gas exploitation and pipeline projects to export electricity and gas to 
China and Thailand. 
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Table 11.  FDI inward stock in selected Southeast Asia countries 
 
Source:  UNCTAD (2012); IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012. 
 
Figure 16.  Approved FDI to Myanmar by sector 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Organization (CSO), Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, March 
2013. 
 
However, all sanctions have been either relaxed or lifted  in response to  the 
reforms of Myanmar’s current government. The international business community has 
drastically altered its  perception of Myanmar, from that an outpost of tyranny to the 
last economic and business frontier in Asia. Since mid-2011, business missions to 
Myanmar have boomed, and hotel and office rental charges have jumped three to five 
times. Accordingly, the number of foreign investments in manufacturing is rapidly 
increasing (Figure 17). 
 
TableXX: FDI inward stock in selected Southeast Asia countries
1990 2000 2011 1990 2000 2011 2005-07 2008-10 2011
Bangladesh 477 2162 6166 1.6 4.6 5.4 24 66 18
Cambodia 38 1580 6850 4.2 43.3 52.1 21 103 37
Lao PDR 13 588 2521 1.4 35.9 31.9 27 49 13
Myanmar 281 3211 9123 10.1 36.1 18.2 6 16 11
Thailand 8242 29915 139735 9.6 24.4 41.2 377 827 137
Vietnam 1650 20596 72778 25.5 66.1 59.8 657 797 172
(Source) UNCTAD, WIR 2012; IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, Oct., 2012.
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Figure 17.  Approved FDI to Myanmar by sector (number) 
 
Source:  CSO, Selected Monthly Economic Indicators, March 2013. 
 
 To explore the potential benefits of FDI, Myanmar must first attract FDI and 
develop an appropriate strategy to spread its benefits across the national economy. 
According to the experiences of its forerunners among the ASEAN countries, general 
policy recommendations are simple and conclusive. In addition, the policies that 
enhance a country’s economic development are effective to attract FDI and benefit from 
it. These policies include (1) developing and improving various infrastructures, (2) 
stabilizing the macro economy, (3) establishing an open trade policy, (4) providing 
capable human resources, and (5) setting up an investment promotion agency. 
In contrast, the effectiveness of various policies intended to directly facilitate 
spillover, such as regulations on local content, joint ventures, or technology sharing, is 
arguable. If implemented, these restrictions are expected to negatively impact FDI 
inflows, particularly from developed countries. Moreover, these policies are prohibited 
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by the TRIMs (Trade Related Investment Measures) agreement of the WTO and are 
difficult to implement, although developing countries are temporarily exempted from 
the prohibitions as long as the policies are coherent with Article XVIII of GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariff and Trade), which considers the difficulties of developing 
countries. 
There are ample lessons Myanmar can learn from the experiences of its neighboring 
countries. It can capitalize on its latecomer advantage and design a comprehensive and 
consistent set of policies to promote FDI and benefit from it. 
 
 
4. Two-polar growth strategy 
As previously mentioned, one of the four economic policies that President U Thein 
Sein announced on June 19, 2012, includes “balanced and proportionate development 
among states and regions with equal share of budget and taxation, foreign aid and 
foreign and local investment.” Thus, the Myanmar government seeks higher and 
balanced economic growth, which is challenging because some economic studies have 
identified a trade-off between higher economic growth and regional equality, 
particularly for countries in the early stages of development. 
This section proposes a two-polar growth strategy that includes both “high” and 
“balanced” growth. The first growth pole is Yangon and the second is Mandalay. Nay 
Pyi Taw, the national capital, will develop as an administrative center, rather than as an 
economic or commercial one. In addition, we propose border development with 
enhanced connectivity to richer neighboring countries as a complementary strategy to 
the two growth poles.
9
 
 
4.1. Balance between “balanced” and “high” growth 
Currently, when many countries suffer and fail to manage regional income 
inequality, “balanced regional economic growth” is an attractive policy slogan. 
However, it is debatable whether equality with higher economic growth is feasible. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between economic growth and regional 
income inequality, finding that the latter is not merely an adverse effect of the former; 
the two phenomena have circular causation. Economic growth enhances economic 
                                                   
9
 For details, see Kudo and Kumagai (2012). 
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agglomeration, and vice versa. The rationale is that inevitably, economic growth is 
geographically uneven because it is more advantageous to conduct business operations 
in certain regions as compared with others. Workers and firms tend to agglomerate in 
developed regions, seeking higher wages and larger markets. Thus, economic growth 
enhances economic agglomeration. Furthermore, economic agglomeration is a source of 
positive externalities such as labor pooling and knowledge spillover, enabling the 
provision of physical and institutional infrastructures efficiently and with limited 
resources. Therefore, economic agglomeration enhances economic growth. The first 
principle of economic development seems to be that scarce development resources 
should not be widely spread among regions, particularly in the early stages of 
development. 
It is important to examine how the geographical concentration of economic activity 
in other developing countries changed during periods of rapid economic growth. The 
benchmarks for Myanmar seem to be Thailand and Vietnam, both of which have land 
areas and population sizes comparable to Myanmar’s.10 Thailand and Vietnam have 
contrasting spatial structures of economic activities. Thailand is a typical “one-polar” 
country, while Vietnam is a two-polar country. Figure 18 illustrates the GDP density 
(GDP per km
2
) of Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Thailand’s economic activity is 
obviously concentrated around Bangkok, while Vietnam has two agglomerations of 
economic activity: around Hanoi in the north and Ho Chi Minh City in the south. 
Considering Myanmar’s spatial development strategy, it is important to select a one- or 
two-polar (or many-polar) structure.  
On the basis of the population and GDP density by district, as well as the industrial 
distribution, we find that Yangon is eligible to be the first pole of economic growth, 
because both economic activity and population are concentrated there. In addition, we 
identify Mandalay as the second pole of economic growth, because Mandalay and its 
surrounding area, including the poor Central Dry Zone (CDZ), already have a certain 
level of economic activity and population, although the agglomeration is smaller than 
that in Yangon. To forecast the consequences of each development strategy, we conduct 
a simulation analysis using an IDE Geographical Simulation Model (IDE-GSM). We 
analyze the relationship among the number of development poles, Myanmar’s national 
GDP, and Yangon and Mandalay’s share in national GDP.11 
 
 
                                                   
10
 Although Vietnam has a larger population than Myanmar, both are mid-sized countries in 
mainland Southeast Asia. 
11
 For details of the simulation model, see Kumagai et al. (2012). 
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Figure 18.  GDP density of Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam 
 
Source:  Authors based on IDE-GSM dataset. 
 
We assume that the costs of increasing productivity in a growth pole are 
proportional to its population. Furthermore, we assume that available public 
development expenditure is fixed, and that if the number of development poles is 
increased, the expenditure is shared by all growth pole regions in proportion to their 
population. In addition, the increase in productivity of each region is assumed to be 
proportional to the development expenditure per capita. 
Considering these assumptions, the two-polar strategy would decrease Yangon’s 
GDP share to 43.1% from 55.1%, whereas the national GDP would slightly increase by 
1.54 times from 1.49 times. Moreover, Mandalay’s GDP share would increase to 19.1% 
from 10.8%. There appears to be no trade-off between higher growth and lower 
inequality in the two-polar strategy. However, if development resources are spread 
across many poles (we assume 15 regions, including Yangon and Mandalay), the 
national GDP decreases by 1.20 times, whereas the Yangon’s GDP share decreases to 
30.4% (Figure 19). 
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Figure 19.  The number of growth poles, national GDP and GDP share of Yangon 
and Mandalay (as of 2030) 
 
Source:  Authors based on IDE-GSM simulation results. 
 
 
In addition, from the viewpoint of poverty eradication the two-polar strategy seems 
appropriate. As depicted in Figure 20, Yangon, Myanmar’s economic center, has a 
poverty share of 8.1%. Combined with neighboring Ayeyarwady, the poverty share 
becomes 26.7%. If Yangon addresses the problem of poverty in Mandalay and Magway, 
which is a part of the populated and poor CDZ, the share reaches 50.6%, marginally 
higher than half the national poverty population. This figure is clearly too high, 
indicating that a poverty eradication strategy dependent on monocentric economic 
agglomeration in Yangon is risky. Considering that Mandalay already has relatively high 
economic agglomeration, it is more reasonable for Mandalay to address its own problem 
of poverty as well as that of neighboring Magway (and Sagaing). For Myanmar, a 
two-polar economic structure such as that of Vietnam seems desirable. 
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Figure 20.  Poverty share by region/state (2010) 
 
Source:  Authors based on UNDP (2011). 
 
4.2. Border development with enhanced connectivity 
As previously discussed, a certain degree of concentration of economic activity is 
inevitable and even desirable for developing countries, especially for LDCs. However, 
regions along the economic periphery, such as the mountainous border regions of 
Myanmar, need attention. It is difficult to encourage certain types of industries to invest 
in less developed regions with small populations.  
The first principle of economic development discussed in this paper is that scarce 
development resources should not be spread across many regions, especially in the early 
stages of economic development. Considering that Myanmar is surrounded by wealthier 
neighboring countries, enhancing its connectivity with these nations is key to balanced 
development that does not divert a large amount of development resources from 
economic centers.  
The economic effects of enhancing connectivity are analyzed using IDE-GSM. In 
this “enhanced connectivity” scenario, we combine the following: (a) customs 
facilitation measures at certain national borders in 2015–2020, (b) upgrades to roads 
connecting these borders that pass through major cities in Myanmar in 2015–2020, and 
(c) connections of Dawei and Kyaukphyu ports with India and Europe in 2020. 
Table 12 indicates that, among the seven regions in which Burmese people mostly 
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live and the seven states in which ethnic minorities primarily live, the income gap was 
narrowed through enhancement of connectivity. Further, the average income of the 
abovementioned regions and states was higher in comparison with that in the two-polar 
strategy without enhanced connectivity. This simulation result reveals that enhancing 
connectivity considerably increases GDP in periphery regions without reducing GDP in 
economic centers. Moreover, all inequality measures improved in comparison with 
those in the two-polar strategy without enhanced connectivity. 
 
Table 12.  Inequality between seven regions and seven states in Myanmar by 
development strategy 
  
Seven Regions 
 (vs Seven States=1.0) 
GDP per capita 
(national avg.(2005)=1.0) 
  GDP 
GDP 
per capita 
Seven 
Regions 
Seven 
States 
National 
Actual (2005) 3.01  1.12  1.03  0.92  1.00  
No Public Investment (2030) 3.42  1.15  3.63  3.15  3.51  
1-Polar (2030) 5.73  1.74  5.47  3.14  4.93  
2-Polar (2030) 5.92  1.79  5.64  3.15  5.06  
2-Polar+Connectivity (2030) 5.80  1.76  5.75  3.26  5.17  
Many-Polar (2030) 4.02  1.30  4.35  3.33  4.10  
Source:  Authors based on IDE-GSM simulation results. 
 
A two-polar growth strategy and border development with enhanced connectivity 
prevents over- or under-concentration and facilitates high and balanced growth. To 
facilitate the feasibility of this strategy, spatially targeted investment, including physical 
and institutional infrastructure, is required in Yangon, Mandalay, and certain border 
areas. 
Making Yangon and Mandalay growth poles and enabling them to contribute to the 
alleviation of poverty is challenging. Accordingly, the establishment of special 
economic zones (SEZs) can be an effective policy tool to promote industrial clusters in 
targeted areas. Another important policy tool is the promotion of FDI, as discussed in 
the previous section. Without substantial FDI inflows, Myanmar, one of the least 
developed economies in the region, cannot be integrated into East Asian production and 
distribution networks. For this, too, Yangon and Mandalay are the keys to attracting FDI 
into Myanmar. 
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5.  Re-emergence of Myanmar:  
From a missing link to a connecting node 
5.1. New international environment 
Despite being an ASEAN country since 1997, Myanmar’s economy has been 
substantively insulated from regional and global economies, with the significant 
exception of China. This is primarily because of economic sanctions imposed by the 
United States and the EU. The high degree of uncertainty under the military government 
has prevented other ASEAN countries from enhancing their engagement with 
Myanmar’s economy. 
Myanmar’s re-emergence into regional and global economies is taking place in a 
changing external environment, as previously discussed. During the decades of 
Myanmar’s isolation, neighboring countries among developing Asian countries 
achieved remarkable economic growth. Developing Asian countries are now strongly 
connected to the global economy through regional production networks that have 
expanded the frontiers of Myanmar’s neighboring countries such as Thailand, China, 
and India. In fact, Myanmar has long been the significant missing link in regional 
production networks. Paradoxically, this is the breakthrough. Although regional 
production networks have not expanded to Myanmar, they have reached its neighboring 
countries such as Thailand, China, and India. By enhancing its connectivity with these 
countries, Myanmar can join well-developed regional production networks and enjoy 
the benefits of participating in them. This strategy accelerates Myanmar’s re-emergence 
into the global economy. In addition, Myanmar is expected to become the node 
connecting three of the world’s most vibrant economies—China, India, and ASEAN 
countries. 
The recent political and economic reforms in Myanmar have completely altered the 
landscape surrounding the country. Japan’s waiving of outstanding debts worth JPY 300 
billion in early 2012 was the first major response from the international community, 
inducing unprecedented interest in Myanmar from Japanese companies. In response to 
the successful by-election in April 2012, the United States and the EU began gradually 
lifting their sanctions. In addition, with the effective support from Japan, the Paris Club 
provided debt relief of USD 6 billion to Myanmar, paving the way for the World Bank 
and the ADB to resume fresh aid to Myanmar.
12
 
                                                   
12
 The Paris Club cancelled half of the arrears owed by Myanmar in two stages, rescheduling the 
rest over 15 years, with a seven-year grace period. Because Myanmar’s arrears owed to the World 
Bank and the ADB were cleared owing to the Japanese support, they resumed assistance to Myanmar, 
offering USD 440 million in credit and a USD 512 million loan, respectively.  
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Thailand began committing to  a comprehensive development project in Dawei, 
which is known as a part of the Mekong–India Economic Corridor (MIEC).13 This 
project is expected to enhance the connectivity between the Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS) and India by creating a shorter alternative route to connect the two vibrant 
economies. Moreover, Thailand began providing official assistance to upgrade the road 
infrastructure between Kawkaleik and Mawlamyine, a critical section that physically 
connects Myanmar, Thailand, and beyond. The re-emergence of Myanmar provided 
Thailand with new and feasible opportunities to expand its economic activities to 
Myanmar, India, and beyond. 
India has been re-engaging with Myanmar as a part of its re-activated “Look East 
Policy.” Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Myanmar in May 2012, 
marking the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister in a quarter of a century, and signed 
an Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with President U Thein Sein to enhance 
bilateral economic ties. India and Myanmar agreed to double bilateral trade by 2015, 
and for this purpose, India agreed to provide USD 500 million in credit, with a focus on 
connectivity-related projects such as repairs and upgrades to bridges on the Tamu–
Kalewa friendship road along ASEAN Highway No. 1. In addition, the two countries 
signed an Air Services Agreement , an agreement for border area development projects, 
among other agreements. Connectivity with Myanmar is expected to contribute to the 
economic development of the Northeast Region (NER), a relatively isolated part of the 
country.
14
 
Myanmar’s relationship with China has evolved differently. Before democratization 
under the Thein Sein administration, China functioned as a guardian for the military 
government. During the absence of other development partners, China initiated several 
development projects, such as a deep sea port and an SEZ in Kyaukphyu, oil and gas 
pipelines connecting Kyaukphyu and China’s Yunnan Province, and hydropower plants 
in the border areas, based on its strategic interests to open an alternative route to the 
Indian Ocean and meet the rapidly growing demand for energy. The resulting 
over-dependence on China has been reviewed since the opening up of Myanmar, and 
                                                   
13
 On July 23, 2012, President U Thein Sein and Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) to collaborate on  the Dawei development project, which 
was implemented on the basis of an MoU between Myanmar Port Authority and a Thai private 
developer, Italian-Thai Development, Plc. MIEC is an extended version of the Southern Economic 
Corridor under the Greater Mekong Subregion program led by the ADB. For details on MIEC and 
the Dawei development project, see ERIA (2010) and Kimura et al. (2011), for example. 
Furthermore, MIEC is recognized as a key project in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 
(ASEAN, 2010). 
14
 For more on views from India, refer to Pulipaka (2013) and Kimura et al. (2011), for example. 
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bilateral ties are currently at a crossroads.
15
 The suspension of the Myitsone Dam 
project, declared on September 30, 2011, is regarded as a historic event. Nonetheless, 
China is and will remain one of Myanmar’s most important neighbors with regard to 
designing a long-term vision for its economic development in the emerging context. 
These developments were triggered by the dramatic political and economic reforms 
in Myanmar since the inauguration of the “civilian” government, and they will help the 
country implement the initiatives under the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
Blueprint and enhance its connectivity with neighboring countries and the global 
economy. 
For this to occur, Myanmar must implement several things. First, Myanmar needs 
to develop domestic economic corridors with effective connectivity to international 
economic corridors; this has already been expanded to  neighboring countries such as 
China, Thailand, and India.
16
 Figure 21 highlights Myanmar’s strategic location as a 
regional connecting node. Myanmar can open two main routes to connect ASEAN 
countries and India: the sea route as the west link of the Mekong–India Economic 
Corridor (MIEC) and land routes with various optional routes along the trilateral 
highway between Thailand, Myanmar, and India. 
The west link of MIEC, from Bangkok to Chennai via Dawei, is designed to 
enhance the connectivity between Bangkok and Chennai, where large manufacturing 
agglomerations have been formed by a significant amount of FDI, especially in 
automotive and electronics sectors. The enhanced connectivity between Bangkok and 
Chennai is expected to enable these manufacturing companies to improve their 
competitiveness by reviewing and restructuring their production networks, including 
further fragmentation of certain production processes. Reflecting the potential benefits, 
ASEAN leaders agreed to promote the completion of MIEC in the Master Plan on 
ASEAN Connectivity (ASEAN, 2010). 
However, the MIEC is not sufficient to overcome the several challenges that the 
region faces. To effectively expand regional production networks, which is crucial to 
pursuing deepening economic integration while narrowing development gaps, physical 
infrastructure for land transportation must be improved. There remains a large area 
along the north bank of the Andaman Sea, consisting of Myanmar and Northeast India, 
with per capita income of less than USD 500. These economies are characterized by 
agriculture and other natural resource industries, as opposed to by manufacturing. For 
these regions, enhanced connectivity with neighboring cities and countries is essential 
                                                   
15
 See Kudo (2012) for the history and current status of the bilateral relationship between China and 
Myanmar. 
16
 The development of domestic economic corridors is discussed later in this section. 
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to widen their access to large markets and invite new industries and fragmented 
production processes  based on their location advantages. 
 
Figure 21.  Myanmar as an emerging connecting node 
 
Source: Kimura, et al (2011). 
 
Second, to effectively join the regional production networks, Myanmar must 
substantially reduce service link costs, which comprise the costs to link remotely 
located production blocks (ERIA, 2010). The lower the service link costs, the greater 
the opportunities for foreign investors to consider Myanmar as a destination for the 
second unbundling. Most necessary measures, such as trade liberalization and 
facilitation, investment liberalization and facilitation, service liberalization, 
infrastructure development, and facilitation measures in the transport sector, are 
included in the AEC Blueprint. Although Myanmar has encountered difficulties in 
implementing the AEC Blueprint, it can now expect unprecedented assistance from the 
international business community. 
Finally, it is important for Myanmar to strategically identify cities to develop as 
industrial agglomerations. Despite the strong political motivation for balanced and 
inclusive economic growth, available financial and human resources are insufficient to 
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spread across the country. The experiences of other developing Asian countries indicate 
the importance of creating a critical mass in the early stage of economic development. 
As discussed in the previous section, Yangon and Mandalay are expected to play a key 
role in driving the entire economy. The simulation analysis revealed that this two-polar 
growth strategy is expected to enable Myanmar to achieve high economic growth as 
well as balanced and inclusive economic development. 
 
5.2. Domestic economic corridors 
As previously indicated, the development of domestic economic corridors is 
important to enhance regional connectivity because Myanmar was a missing link in the 
region. International economic corridors, together with production and distribution 
networks, extend only up to Myanmar’s border. To extend these corridors inside 
Myanmar, we envision four domestic corridors: North–South, East–West, Right Sash 
(or Northeast–Southwest), and Left Sash (or Southeast–Northwest).17 
The strategic importance and strategic thrust of the four economic corridors include 
not only supporting the formation of domestic growth poles but also connecting  GMS 
regional networks. 
The four corridors are outlined as follows.  
1) North–South Corridor: The primary corridor will be the Yangon–Mandalay route 
(435 miles), which will connect the growth poles of Yangon and Mandalay. The 
corridor can be extended to Myitkyina in northern Kachin State and up to the 
Myanmar–China border (Kanpiketi) (919 miles). 
2) East–West Corridor: The Tachileik–Kyaington–Taunggyi–Meiktila–Pakokku–
Kalay–India border (Reed) route (1,142 miles) could be a major route in Myanmar. A 
branch of this corridor, Tachileik–Kyaington–Mongla, will be on the GMS North–
South Corridor that links Thailand and China through Myanmar (158 miles). 
3) Right Sash (Northeast–Southwest) Corridor: This corridor connects Muse in the 
north to Kyaukphyu in the south through Mandalay. Further, it will be a new trade 
route along with the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline that links Yunnan Province 
to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar (714 miles). 
                                                   
17
 Beginning in 2012, the four corridors are being surveyed by Myanmar Marketing and Research 
Development (MMRD) as part of an exercise by Myanmar Comprehensive Development Vision 
(MCDV). This exercise is being jointly conducted by the Myanmar Ministry of National Planning 
and Economic Development (NPED) and ERIA. 
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4) Left Sash (Southeast–Northwest) Corridor: The tripartite Myawaddy–Hpa-an–
Mandalay–Monywa–Kalay and Tamu route links Thailand and India through 
Myanmar (942 miles). The corridor will include a Myawaddy–Mawlamyine–Dawei 
branch that will be an extension of the GMS East–West Economic Corridor from Da 
Nang to Mawlamyine and will connect to the  Southern Corridor (397 miles). 
 
The North–South Corridor will be the primary corridor, connecting a growth pole 
(Yangon) and a growth center (Mandalay), and will extend to Kachin State and up to the 
Myanmar–China border. This corridor is intended to serve as the primary route for 
border trade as well as transmission of goods from Upper Myanmar  to Yangon’s ports 
for export. The corridor will then continue to the North–South Corridor via a short 
connection through Thailand to Tak Province.  
The East–West Corridor will become a sub-route of the GMS North–South 
Corridor that links Thailand and China through Myanmar and will provide cost 
effectiveness along the trade route between India and Thailand, which has borne 
relatively high transaction costs due to insufficient road infrastructure. In addition, this 
corridor will connect to the GMS East–West Corridor (EWC), which begins at Danang 
in Vietnam and ends at Mawlamyaine in Myanmar.  
The Right Sash (Northeast–Southwest) Corridor, connecting Muse in the north 
to Kyaukphyu in the south through Mandalay, will be a new trade route between China 
and India along the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline, linking Yunnan Province to 
the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar. It will connect with the GMS Northern Corridor 
along the breadth of Yunnan Province before connecting with northern Myanmar on the 
west and finally reaching the Indian border at Tamu. Infrastructure development 
between Kyaukphyu and Muse will not only facilitate trade between China and India 
but also trade with ethnic groups residing and trading along the corridor. 
The Left Sash (Southeast–Northwest) Corridor will be an extension of the GMS 
East–West Economic Corridor (EWEC) by including the Yangon–Hpa-an link. It will 
address the weak physical connectivity between Myanmar and North India and will 
provide a route for an attractive industrial location for exports to Thailand. Once the 
GMS East–West Corridor is operational, Mawlamyaine and Myawaddy will become 
regional hubs, attracting industries from Thailand and Southeast Asia to invest along the 
corridor.  
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5.3. Contribution of economic corridors to economic development 
Because Myanmar’s economic corridors are intended to deepen the integration of 
ASEAN countries with East Asia, they will reflect the improvement of international 
relations as well as elicit  trading partners’ appreciation for the economic opportunities 
offered by Myanmar. The immediate and most obvious benefit of the economic 
corridors is their contribution to border trade. Myanmar’s economic corridors are 
essentially trade routes between China, India, Myanmar, and Thailand that have the 
potential for transit trade if a cross-border transportation mechanism materializes. In 
addition, remote locations in Myanmar may benefit from positive spillover effects, 
because such places are untapped eco- and cultural tourism destinations. 
Short-, medium-, and long-term strategies for transportation infrastructure 
development and trade facilitation, which will encourage investment in transport and 
logistics services, create effective multi-modal transport systems, and promote the 
tourism sector, will help maintain activity in economic corridors and use these corridors 
optimally for Myanmar’s industrial and economic development.  
The growth poles, transport networks, and hubs along the four corridors are 
displayed in the following figures. 
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Figure 22.  Four economic corridors in Myanmar 
<North-South Economic Corridor> 
 
 
<East-West Economic Corridor> 
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<Right Sash Economic Corridor> 
 
 
<Left Sash Economic Corridor> 
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Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we propose five growth strategies: “Agriculture Plus Plus,” an 
export-oriented strategy, an FDI-driven strategy, a two-polar strategy, and a strategy to 
develop domestic economic corridors. These growth strategies still need to be translated 
into a series of implementable programs and projects. Such a task is beyond the scope 
of this paper and requires a shared comprehensive development vision and close 
consultation with all stakeholders. With these elaborate exercises that are in line with 
the proposed growth strategies, we believe that Myanmar will be able to pursue high, 
sustained, and balanced growth in the future. 
However, being too optimistic about Myanmar’s growth prospects would be naïve. 
The road to reforms includes challenges and transition costs. The absorption capacities 
of institutions may render the reforms ineffective or at least hamper their effectiveness. 
Bureaucracy is the traditional development tool in all developing economies. 
Developing absorption capacities in a bureaucracy is time consuming and might 
significantly influence the government’s development agenda. Moreover, inadequate 
institutionalization in Myanmar raises the valid question regarding the extent to which 
the reforms are intuitive and good intentioned and the extent to which they are a product 
of an institutionalized decision-making process. These agendas have not been discussed 
in this paper. 
These words of caution are not intended to discourage progress or the speed of 
growth-related reforms in Myanmar. However, it is important to check the weak links in 
the reform process and address them even as the country progresses toward openness 
and stability. Eventually, sustained growth for the livelihood of its people may serve as 
the best cushion against challenges to development in Myanmar. 
 
  
 48 
References 
 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2012). Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2012, 
43rd ed., Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) (2012). ASEAN 2030: Toward a Borderless 
Economic Community: Draft Highlights, Tokyo: ADBI. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (2010). Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 
Baldwin, Richard (2004). “Openness and Growth: What’s the Empirical Relationship?” 
Richard Baldwin and Alan Winters eds., Challenges to Globalization: Analyzing 
the Economics, Chicago: NBER and University of Chicago Press. 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) (2010). The 
Comprehensive Asia Development Plan, Jakarta: ERIA. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (various issues). World Economic Outlook, 
Washington, D.C.: IMF. 
JETRO (2013). Yangon Style (in Japanese), available at 
 http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/asia/mm/reports/07001289. 
Kimura, Fukunari, and Ayako Obashi (2010). “International Production Networks in 
Machinery Industries: Structure and Its Evolution,” ERIA Discussion Paper Series, 
No. ERIA-DP-2010-09, September 2010. 
Kimura, Fukunari, Toshihiro Kudo and So Umezaki (2011). “ASEAN-India 
Connectivity: A Regional Framework and Key Infrastructure Projects,” in 
Fukunari Kimura and So Umezaki eds., ASEAN India Connectivity: The 
Comprehensive Asia Development Plan, Phase II, ERIA Research Project Report 
2010, No.7, Jakarta: ERIA. 
Kubo, Koji (2013). “Rice Policies in Myanmar: A Comparative Analysis with Vietnam,” 
in Hank Lim and Yasuhiro Yamada eds., Economic Reforms in Myanmar: 
Pathways and Prospects, BRC Research Report No.10, available at 
 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Brc/10.html. 
Kudo, Toshihiro (2012). “China’s Policy toward Myanmar: Challenges and Prospects,” 
available at 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/pdf/201209_kudo.pdf. 
Kudo, Toshihiro, and Satoru Kumagai (2012). “Two-Polar Growth Strategy in 
Myanmar: Seeking “High” and “Balanced” Development” IDE Discussion Paper 
No.371, 
available at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/371.html. 
_____ (2013). “Export-Oriented Growth Strategy for Myanmar: Joining Production 
Networks in East Asia” BRC Policy Review on Myanmar Economy, Available at 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Brc/PolicyReview/pdf/09.pdf. 
Kudo, Toshihiro; Satoru Kumagai; Hikari Ishido (2013). “Agriculture Plus Plus: Growth 
 49 
Strategy for Myanmar Agriculture” IDE Discussion Paper No.421, available at 
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/421.html. 
Kumagai, Satoru; Keola Souknilanh; Toshihiro Kudo (2012a). “Myanmar Economy 
Viewed at Night,” Policy Review on Myanmar Economy, No.4, IDE-JETRO. 
Kumagai, Satoru; Kazunobu Hayakawa; Ikumo Isono; Keola Souknilanh; Kenmei 
Tsubota (2012b). “Geographical Simulation Analysis for Logistics Enhancement 
in Asia” IDE Discussion Paper No. 369, 
available at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/369.html. 
Markusen, James R., (2004). Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, 
MIT Press. 
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development (NPED), Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) (2011). Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar 
(2009-2010): Poverty Profile, Poverty Dynamics Report, MDG Data Report. 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Malaysia (MITI) (1995). Second Industrial 
Master Plan: 1996-2005, Kuala Lumpur, MITI. 
Pulipaka, Sanjay (2013). “India-Myanmar Connectivity: A Strategic Imperative”, Issue 
Brief, Vol.3, Issue 1, New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations (ICRIER). 
Rodriguez, F.R. and Dani Rodrik (2001). “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A 
Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” NBER Macroeconomic Annual 
2000, Vol.15, pp.261-325. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2012), World 
Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies, New 
York and Geneva. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2011). Integrated Household Living 
Conditions Survey in Myanmar (2009-2010): Poverty Profile: Yangon, UNDP. 
_____ (2013). Human Development Report, New York: UNDP. 
World Bank (2007). World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, 
Washington DC. 
_____ (2013). International Debt Statistics 2013, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
